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Abstract 
This paper explores the structural changes in the international organisation of automotive 
production since the early 1990s. We apply descriptive network measures to international trade 
data for the period 1993-2013 for three automotive component groups with different 
technological intensity, with the aim of understanding: 1) How the automotive international 
trade network has changed since the beginning of the 1990s; 2) Whether regionalisation has 
increased over time; 3) How the role that rising powers play within and between regions 
interacts with regionalisation patterns. Our findings suggest that the structure of trade has 
changed significantly over the last two decades in all components. The network for electric and 
electrical parts and engines has evolved to become more hierarchical, with a cohesive core tied 
to hangers-on in the periphery, while the opposite has happened for rubber and metal. 
Regionalisation patterns also show important differences across components. Finally, we have 
found an apparent association between the strengthening of regionalisation patterns and the role 
played by traditional players and rising powers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Whether international trade and production networks are regional or global has long been 
of great interest and importance to scholars and policy makers (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 
2014; Los et al, 2015). This interest has been kept alive by the fact that over the past quarter 
century we have witnessed important transformations to the way in which production is 
organised and trade is structured, with often concomitant yet opposing tendencies towards 
globalisation and regionalisation.  
Over the last two decades, global trade and financial flows have registered unprecedented 
growth, to a great extent due to the increasing trade by the emerging economies, in particular 
the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China), but also by many low and middle income 
countries (many of which have doubled their total share of world exports) (Hanson, 2012). 
Among the reasons for that unprecedented growth of world trade is the increasing number of 
trade agreements between geographically distant countries since the early Nineties, with 
developing or emerging countries becoming very active in signing preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs), to the point that the vast majority of PTAs are now active between developing or 
emerging countries (Iapadre and Tajoli, 2014). 
The 2007-2008 economic crisis had a substantial impact on the structure of production in 
most industries, accelerating the integration of emerging economies in the production process, 
where they have become increasingly important players (Hanson, 2012). In the automotive 
3 
 
industry, the financial crisis resulted in an increased shift of production to developing countries, 
not only to take advantage of lower operating costs, but also to benefit from the strong sales 
growth in these nations especially when compared with mature markets in developed nations, 
where sales growth has slowed (Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2011).  
Along with a shift of production activities to emerging economies in this industry, there 
has also been an increase of internationalisation activities by automakers from developing 
nations, enhancing their capabilities through a number of high-level acquisitions. The financial 
crisis provided the opportunity for auto firms from developing nations to acquire distressed auto 
firms from the traditional group of auto producers located in industrialised countries. For 
instance, in 2010, Geely, a Chinese firm, acquired Ford’s Swedish car maker Volvo in a $1.8 
billion deal (The Economist, 2010). Other famous examples are India’s Tata Motors’ purchase 
of Jaguar and Land Rover from Ford for $2.3 billion (The Economist, 2008).    
At the same time, intra-regional economic linkages have also become much stronger, with 
the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and common currency areas, pointing to 
two apparently contradictory trends.  The number of RTAs increased dramatically in the 
Nineties and even more during the following decade. In particular, since the mid-Nineties a 
new wave of regional agreements has characterised former communist countries (Gaulier, Jean 
and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004). According to Gaulier, Jean and Ünal-Kesenci (2004) institutional 
arrangements have also consistently been found to be the leading explanation for increasing 
regionalisation in Western Europe, Southeast Asia and North America since the late Eighties.  
With a different argument, Rugman (2008) reinforces the idea of regions as the central 
locus of governance of commercial activity. He argues that multinational corporations are 
actually regional firms with global interests, and points to a decline in economic globalisation 
and a steady increase in regional economic activity.  
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Recent work in the area of the international political economy has identified two ways in 
which regionalism might emerge as an outcome or evolution of, or response to globalisation. 
On the one hand, it can be argued that rather than being contradictory trends, regionalism 
represents a stepping-stone on the way to globalisation, offering more protection than countries 
would experience in the global market. This is the notion of ‘open regionalism’, which is in 
contrast to the ‘closed’ regionalism of the 1960s and 1970s aimed at insulating members from 
the world economy in line with dependency theories. On the other hand, regionalism can be 
seen as an attempt by the State to resist the negative effects of globalisation in order to preserve 
domestic agendas – such as redistribution – that are threatened by globalisation. According to 
these views then, the two concomitant yet apparently opposite trends of regionalisation and 
globalisation could be complementary rather than contradictory (Nesadurai, 2002).  
In this paper, we also examine how patterns of multipolarity interact with regionalisation 
trends, and more specifically, how the role that rising powers play within and between regions 
interacts with regionalisation patterns.1 Chen and De Lombaerde (2014) argue that while the 
growth strategies of the BRICs and their integration in the world production system has been 
extensively investigated, less attention has been paid to how integration in the global economy 
is related to integration in the regional economy.  
Many studies (including among others, Clegg, 2009; Chen and Lombaerde, 2014; Garzόn, 
2016) argue that the BRICs phenomenon mirrors a general shift in the international balance of 
power, with the centre of gravity moving from the north to the south, and power becoming more 
distributed among multiple poles.  
The fact that most of the rising powers are also the sole regional powers of their home 
regions has led some scholars to argue that the advent of multipolarity is likely to strengthen a 
trend towards a more regionalised international order. Others challenge this view, according to 
which especially in the global south where intraregional links tend to be weak, there may be 
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centrifugal forces within regions (Garzόn, 2016). In addition to looking at the extent to which 
regionalisation is linked to the degree of connectedness of the peripheral countries within the 
periphery, we also investigate whether regionalisation is linked to the brokerage roles played 
by individual countries, with a focus on the rising powers.  
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTION 
In this paper we analyse the case of automotive parts and components to answer the 
following research questions: (i) How has the structure of trade changed over the last two 
decades, especially with the participation in the production process of emerging economies as 
new suppliers? (ii) Has regionalisation increased over time, and do tendencies towards 
regionalisation differ across automotive parts and component groups? (iii) How do patterns of 
multipolarity interact with regionalisation trends, and more specifically, how does the role 
played by rising powers within and between regions interact with regionalisation patterns? 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the impact of the financial crisis 
on the structure of international trade, our analysis spans over two decades that include the 
2008, allowing some insight into how the structure of trade in these components changed 
following the financial crisis, and consequent changes in the location patterns of components 
suppliers.  
The automotive industry is well suited to answer the above research questions. This 
industry was traditionally shaped on a regional basis, with carmakers organised on a continental 
scale, in both commercial and productive aspects. However, the more recent vertical 
disintegration of carmakers and the consequent increase in the power of suppliers may have 
led, in some cases, to a growth in the international exchange of auto parts (Frigant and Zumpe, 
2014). 
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We have sought to answer our research questions by using highly disaggregated trade data 
for three automotive parts and components groups with different technological intensity 
(electric and electrical parts, engines, and rubber and metal). The use of parts and components 
trade as a suitable proxy for participation in international production networks is commonplace 
(Blázquez and González-Díaz, 2015). Since the 1990s, intermediate goods exchanges have 
represented an increasing proportion of the international goods trade (Feenstra, 1998). This 
evolution is widely recognised as being the result of the increased international fragmentation 
of production processes, mainly linked to three factors: the movement towards vertical 
disintegration of large firms that rely increasingly on outsourcing; the international division of 
labour set up by these firms; and the increased participation of new countries – such as China 
– in world trade (Frigant and Zumpe, 2014).  
Network analysis can provide useful tools to analyse the structure of trade at both the 
regional and global level (Piccardi and Tajoli, 2012). The economic geography literature has 
emphasized that the relative position of the region within the whole network of interactions is 
a key issue faced by firms when choosing where to locate and thus also influences the way they 
organize their production, management and outsourcing patterns. Scholars in this area highlight 
how any change that directly involves one or two regions are unlikely to leave the remaining 
regions unaffected. Network analysis is, therefore, the ideal tool to capture these complex 
interdependencies (Blázquez and González-Díaz, 2015). In this paper we combine a plurality 
of network measures and network visualitation tools in order to understand how trade in  
automotive parts and components has changed over the last two decades and across 
components.  
It is interesting to explore differences across auto parts and components, as these differ 
significantly in terms of factorial or technological intensity. These differences will influence 
transportation costs, transaction cost and the extent to which scale economies can be exploited, 
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and are therefore reflected in companies’ outsourcing and location decisions (Blázquez and 
González-Díaz, 2015).  
To answer our first research question about changes in the structure of production and trade 
over the last two decades, we look at how the size and composition of the international trade 
network has changed in each automotive component group under examination. We also look at 
how the average number of trading partners, as well as the average value of trade flows has 
changed over time. Additionally, we look at whether the distribution of exports has become 
more skewed, with only a few countries accounting for most of the world trade, or whether 
export flows are evenly distributed in the network. Finally, we examine whether the 
international trade network for each component has evolved over time to become more 
hierarchical, with a cohesive core tied to hangers-on in the periphery. 
Empirical studies analysing regionalisation and globalisation trends have been developed 
within different theoretical perspectives and seek to contribute to different literature strands, 
including international trade, international business and economic geography. Many of the 
studies investigating specifically the automotive industry have taken a Global Value Chain or 
Global Production Network perspective. This paper will refer to all of these different related 
literatures with the aim to contribute to the regionalisation debate by providing a detailed 
analysis of a specific industry. Sturgeon et al. (2009) provide several reasons of why analysis 
at the industry level is important. They also look at the automotive industry and explain why it 
presents some very distinctive features compared to other industries.  
Measuring trade regionalization and detecting leadership patterns in regional trade 
networks may be done in a variety of ways, including the use of gravity models, intensity 
indices or network analysis tools. Iapadre and Tajoli (2014) for example apply the tools of 
network analysis in order to take into account whether local trade structures and preferential 
agreements affect the overall system of international trade and study the role of BRICs in the 
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global and regional trade networks in three years 1995, 2008 and 2011. While their analysis – 
and most of the discussion in the regionalisation literature - is at a more aggregated level, in 
this paper we look at a specific industry, because production is organised differently across 
industries, and findings at an aggregated level may not be valid at a more disaggregated level.   
We therefore seek to answer the second research question about whether trade has become 
more or less regionalised by applying a weighted version of the E-I index. This measure enables 
an assessment of the degree of regionalisation and globalisation of individual countries as well 
as that of entire regions by revealing how much of the total value of trade of an individual 
country or region is within the region or across regions.  
Furthermore, the paper aims to add to the literature on the role of rising powers in a 
multipolar world by looking at how patterns of regionalisation interact with the role that these 
powers play in the international trade network. While centrality measures have been used to 
answer questions similar to this one (see for example Iapadre and Tajoli, 2014), we believe that 
a more in-depth analysis of the role of emerging economies and in particular of rising powers 
that looks at the different brokerage roles these countries play may shed new light.  
We therefore seek to answer our third research question about the role of rising powers 
within and between regions by performing a brokerage analysis of the BRIC countries.  
The next section describes in detail the data and the methodology, while section four 
presents and discusses the findings, with the last section presenting the conclusions.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 DATA 
Following the empirical literature on production fragmentation, pioneered by Yeats (2001) 
and pursued in a number of recent studies (including Ng and Yeats, 2003; Athukorala, 2005; 
Kimura, 2006; Athukorala and Yamashita, 2008; Amighini and Gorgoni, 2013) we use bilateral 
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trade statistics on auto parts and components trade from the UN trade data reporting system 
(UNComtrade database).2  
Following Amighini and Gorgoni (2013), highly disaggregated trade data at product level 
are used as proxy for the production of automotive components. We have selected 
disaggregated trade data at 5 digits level, representing detailed product categories for each of 
the components used in automobile production, using the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC, Rev. 3). These components amounted to a total of 30 commodity groups. 
However, the products are far from being a single homogenous category, including relatively 
low technology parts such as various rubber and metal parts, as well as components with higher 
technological content such as computer equipment and electrical parts. As production 
fragmentation is largely driven by technological factors, different types of auto parts are likely 
to differ in the way production is organised across countries due to diverse technological content 
and value-to-weight ratios (Hummels, 2007). Therefore, we have aggregated 19 of the 30 
commodity groups (4 electric and electrical, 9 rubber and metal parts, 6 engines) into 3 
component groups with different technological content: electric and electrical parts, engines, 
and rubber and metal parts.3 For each of the three groups we take the bilateral trade flows in 
1993, 2003 and 2013 as reference years to map the changes in the international structure of 
automotive production that have occurred since the beginning of the 1990s.4 The trade value 
for each given year represents the average over three years (the reference year and the preceding 
and following years, in order to smooth out random variations).  
For each of the auto components examined, a value is given to the trade relationship (i.e. 
tie) between any two pairs of countries [ij] according to the value of their bilateral trade flow 
[wij] over the world’s total for that good in a specific year. We take the shares because we are 
interested in the relative position of each country in the network and its changes over time.  
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As a criterion for setting the network boundary, only those countries with bilateral flows 
accounting for at least 0.01 per cent of the world’s total have been included. This covers on 
average 95 per cent of all world trade (see Table 1). This threshold was selected to ensure that 
only the most relevant nations and ties were included in the network. Without a threshold a 
large number of nations would be included that contribute very little to international trade yet 
have a substantial impact on structural features of the network, such as reciprocity and density. 
This paper also uses directed trade flows, which allows accounting for ‘asymmetric 
dependence’ (Silva and Teixeira, 2008: 283) in order to better analyse structural 
transformations shaped by globalisation and investigate the existence of hierarchical and core-
periphery structures.  
Table 1 about here 
 
Based on the trade data described, nine squared directed and valued matrices were created 
and analysed. In the network visualisations the nodes represent the countries and the ties 
represent the trade flows among them. The nodes are not the same in all the matrices, as some 
countries may be involved in the trade of some components but not others.  
We have used network visualisation tools to show the changes occurring in the trade 
network for each component over time. In addition, we have calculated some network measures 
to describe and contrast the trade networks over time and across components.  
 
3.2 NETWORK MEASURES 
In order to identify changes over time and make comparisons across components, we have 
used some descriptive measures commonly used in social network analysis (SNA) to analyse 
the structure of a network (Wassermann and Faust, 1994). A first consideration is the difference 
in size (i.e. number of countries) and composition (which countries participate) of the networks 
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over time and across components. 
The number of trade partners a country has on average is also a useful indicator. In this 
study we are interested in the number of trade partners each country exports to. This is measured 
using Out-Degree Centrality (Knoke and Burt, 1983).  
To account for the fact that a country may export to a high number of other countries (i.e. 
having a high Out-Degree Centrality), but these trade flows may be of little monetary value and 
represent overall only a small proportion of the value of global world trade, we also calculate a 
centrality measure that accounts for the value of each export tie (Freeman, 1979).5  In Table 3 
this is referred to as Weighted Out-Degree Centrality (Out-Degree Centrality weighted by the 
monetary value of each tie).  
Since a prevalence of asymmetric relationships might suggest a more hierarchical structure 
of the international organisation of production, we also calculate a network measure called 
Reciprocity, which provides the percentage of ties that are reciprocated (Wassermann and 
Faust, 1994). 
To investigate whether there is a hierarchical structure within the network – with a cohesive 
core tied to hangers-on in the periphery – we perform a core-periphery analysis (Borgatti and 
Everett, 1999).6  
To see whether exports are distributed evenly among a number of countries or whether they 
are instead concentrated on a few countries which account for most of the global bilateral 
exports, we compute the Out-Degree Centralisation (Freeman, 1979; Scott, 2000). 
To assess whether production of each component group is organised into regional blocs, or 
whether trade is truly global we apply a weighted and normalised version of the E-I index.  In 
its original formulation, the index only looks at the number of ties each country has within and 
across a partition (Krackhardt and Stern, 1988). In this paper we make use of a weighted variant 
of the E-I index that was developed by Danchev and Porter (2017) in their examination of the 
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world migration network and instead of the number of trade ties, we consider the value of the 
trade flows. Below is the formulation of this weighted version of the E-I index: 
 
Weighted E – I Index = 
𝐸𝑤− 𝐼𝑤
𝐸𝑤+ 𝐼𝑤
 
Where: 
 𝐸𝑤 = External weight outside the region 
 𝐼𝑤 = Internal weight within the region 
 
The Weighted E-I score can range from 1 to -1, where positive values indicate that the 
majority of trade (value) occurs outside the region and negativevalues indicate that trade (value) 
is mostly regional. This index can be calculated at the country or regional level.  
As noted by Borgatti et al. (2013) the E-I index at the regional level is somewhat sensitive 
to the size of the region. To address the group size disparity we calculate the weighted E-I index 
at the country level and take the average for each regional group, hence normalising the regional 
score by the number of countries in the region. 
In order to assess the role that rising powers play at the regional level and how this interacts 
with regionalisation patterns in the sector, we make use of brokerage roles (Gould and 
Fernandez, 1989), examining the roles played by nations within and between regions. There are 
five brokerage roles (coordinator, gatekeeper, representative, consultant and liaison) which 
indicate different positions a country may hold.  
Table 2 presents the five brokerage roles with a brief description and visualisation. A 
country is considered to be a coordinator if it imports from and exports to those in the same 
region.  
A gatekeeper imports from a nation outside its region and exports to those within it. This 
role potentially indicates whether a country is a regional supplier in the sector. For example, 
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the gatekeeper role is illustrated in the transit role of the Netherlands, which imports large 
volumes globally to redistribute them across Europe. 
The representative role reflects the case of a country that imports from its own region but 
exports outside its region, linking its region to other regions.  
Finally, the consultant and liaison roles denote the tendency for nations to participate in 
global trading relations rather than holding strong regional positons in the international trade 
network. Consultants act as external players, linking members belonging to the same region, 
which is a different one from its own. Liaisons tend to connect regions that are different, and 
different from its own, indicating that such countries hold a stronger position in the global 
production network (over regional production sites).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In addition to synthetic network measures, network visualisation techniques provide a very 
powerful descriptive tool. Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide representations of the trade networks for 
each of the components at three different intervals, over two decades. In the figures, the node 
and label colours reflect a geographical partition based on the World Bank classification of 
countries, which has been modified to create subcategories within the group ‘Europe and 
Central Asia’. Our classification separately identifies the EU28 countries, countries which are 
part of Europe but not part of the EU (e.g. Norway and Switzerland), countries in Eurasia (e.g. 
Turkey) and countries in Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhstan). Nodes with the same colour belong to 
the same geographic area according to our regional classification.  
The thickness of the lines reflects the value of the trade flow. Thicker lines represent trade 
flows of higher value. Finally, the different colours of the lines indicate whether the flow is 
within (blue) or between (red) regions, thus it visually provides a rough indication of the degree 
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of regionalisation. A prevalence of blue suggests a high degree of regionalisation.   
 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Structural changes in automotive production and the role of new suppliers 
 Table 3 provides some descriptive measures of the analysed networks, allowing a quick 
comparison. The first thing to note is that the networks analysed have different sizes (i.e. 
number of countries participating as exporters of automotive components).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 All the networks changed over time, showing both an increase in size and a change in the 
country composition (see Table 4), with some countries from Central and Eastern Europe (such 
as Poland, Russia and Slovakia) and Asia (such as China, India, Indonesia and Thailand) 
becoming component suppliers only in the twenty-first century.  
 Table 3 also indicates the average number of exporting partners for each country in each 
network, based on the average Out-Degree Centrality of countries in the network. The table 
shows that the average number of export partners increased over time for all components, while 
the Weighted Out-Degree Centrality scores show that the average value of ties decreased.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 Out-Centralisation is a measure of how exports are distributed among all countries. In the 
study, this measure declined over time for all the components, suggesting that exports have 
become more evenly distributed across countries since the 2000s, that is, a larger number of 
countries now account for most of the world’s export flows compared with 1993. 
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It is worth noting that for electric and electrical parts, and also rubber and metal parts, 
Reciprocity was stable over the two decades studied, while for engines it increased over time, 
hinting at the division of labour becoming less hierarchical over time.  
 The core-periphery measure looks at the extent to which there is simultaneously a group of 
countries that are tied in together by commercial bonds and who intensively import and export 
from each other, and a group of countries that is connected to the core very weakly, often by no 
more than one export or import tie. The results in Table 3 reveal that the network for electric 
and electrical parts has evolved towards a more core-periphery structure over time. This has 
happened alongside a shrinking of the core and the participation in the core of new countries. 
In the case of electric and electrical parts, the core of the 1993 network included Belgium-
Luxembourg, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan and the UK. Over time the core shrank 
to only five countries in 2003, namely the US, Japan, Mexico, China and Hong Kong, and, in 
2013, China, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and the US. Remarkably, China was 
importing from only a few countries in 1993 but just a decade later entered the core as an 
exporter to all other countries in the core.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 In 1993 China was trading in electric and electrical parts intensively only with Hong Kong 
and weakly with a limited number of European countries (Figure 1-a). The picture changed 
dramatically over the following decade (Figure 1-b) whereby in the early twenty-first century 
China had become a bigger exporter, very central to the network, forming part of the core and 
brokering across different regions, as shown by the prevalence of red ties representing trade 
flows between the regions (Figure 1-c).  
The Table 3 results for engines show an increased density in trade flows within the core,  
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accompanied by an increase in trade flows from the core to the periphery. Despite a very small 
increase within the periphery, the core-periphery measure for engines suggests that the network 
has become characterised over time by a structure of trade that is increasingly concentrated 
around the core, with very little happening elsewhere.   
Thus, the results of the core-periphery analysis on the electric and electrical parts and 
engines point to a change in the international organisation of auto production towards a more 
hierarchical structure, with parts suppliers exporting to one or a few single major destinations, 
but having no relationships with other supplying countries.  
It is also worth noting that, in the case of engines, the core has become smaller over time, 
going from nine countries in 1993 – including Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden and the UK to just three countries in 2003 and 2013: 
Canada, Mexico and the US.  
Figure 2 shows an increased participation of new countries in the production and trade of 
engines over time. Figures 2-b and 2-c show the strengthening in 2003 and 2013 of Germany’s 
role as a main player in Europe and worldwide in the production of engines, but also Eastern 
European countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic becoming increasingly 
embedded in the network as important parts suppliers. The figures also show the increased 
participation over time of East Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The case of rubber and metal parts is somewhat different from the other two components. 
Table 3 shows that trade flows for rubber and metal parts within the core declined over the time 
period studied, with trade flows from the periphery to the core increasing, suggesting a more 
even distribution of trade flows across countries, and thus a less hierarchical division of labour.  
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The case of rubber and metal is also different in the sense that the size of the core declined 
between 1993 and 2003 but then grew again over the latter decade. However, as with the electric 
and electrical parts and engine, a change can be observed over time in the composition of the 
core and the role played by emerging economies, with countries such as China entering the core 
in 2013 (Table 3), and the Czech Republic and Poland becoming central in Europe (Figures 3-
b and 3-c).  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
4.2 Regionalisation in the automotive production network and the role of regional rising 
powers 
Table 5 shows brokerage roles for the rising powers, along with the US, Germany and 
Japan, which are the traditional dominant players in the sector.  The US has consistently held a 
strong liaison role in the international trade network across component groups. Results are 
presented for 2003 and 2013 to reflect the changes in the roles played by the rising powers in 
the sector before and after the financial crisis, given that it accelerated the integration of 
emerging economies into the industry.  
 
Table 5 about here 
4.2.1. Electric and electrical parts 
For electric and electrical parts, the weighted E-I index in Table 6 indicates that both EU28 
and East Asia & Pacific are characterised by strong regionalisation. This is also shown by the 
heat-map in Figure 4, which provides a visual representation of the index, where the yellow 
zones reflect a tendency towards regionalisation. 
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Figure 4 about here 
 
From Figure 1 also, it can be seen that East Asia & Pacific is characterised by a high level 
of regionalisation that has slightly increased over time, and there is an emergence of an Asian 
regional production network (in the figure, Asian countries are strongly inter-connected by blue 
ties), which is also highly embedded in the global production network (red ties). The weighted 
E-I index for Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean, other European countries, South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa shows that the value of inter-regional ties exceeds the value of intra-
regional ties, but the former has declined over time. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example, it is evident that when looking at the value of trade, the relative importance of intra-
regional trade has increased over time.  
 
China and Japan represent two dominant players in the East Asia and the Pacific region. 
They both hold gatekeeper roles as shown in Table 5, importing from outside the region and 
distributing exports within the region, therefore acting as regional suppliers. 
Table 6 about here 
 
 The emergence of an Asian production network has been accompanied by a strengthening 
of the European production network with the incorporation over time of a new set of players, 
mainly from Eastern Europe, acting as important suppliers to the world’s leading car producers, 
shown, for instance, by the increased centrality of the Czech Republic and Poland. It thus 
appears that there is now a much larger number of suppliers located in different countries from 
those of the major producers (OEM), with Germany still playing a leading gatekeeper role.  
 The Latin America & Caribbean region is not characterised by regionalisation trends to the 
same extent as observed in EU28 and East Asia & Pacific. Table 6 shows that the weighted E-
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I index for this regional partition is positive (most of the value of trade flows is across regions), 
but the score has been declining over time. In this region, Brazil holds a representative role, 
linking the region to other regions, such as North America. Overall these results suggest that 
regionalisation patterns may be associated with transit roles (such as gatekeeper) for the key 
players in the region.   
 
4.2.2. Engines 
In the case of engines, the weighted E-I index in Table 6 and the heat-map in Figure 5 
indicate strong regionalisation for EU28, East Asia & Pacific and North America, but this is 
declining over time. In the case of Latin America & Caribbean instead, most of the value of 
trade is beyond the region rather than within, and the degree of global integration has 
strengthened over time. The remaining regions analysed seem to be highly globally integrated, 
with most of the value of trade coming from inter-regional ties.  
Figure 2 shows that while there has always been a European production network (indicated 
by the blue ties among EU28 countries), this became stronger in 2003. Since 2013, however, 
these regional production networks have become strongly embedded in global trade (red ties, 
indicating trade flows between regions), with Figure 2-c showing a prevalence of red ties. 
The traditional leaders, Japan and Germany, have both shifted from being only gatekeepers 
to also holding liaison roles (linking countries from regions different than their own), while the 
rising powers in this product group have come to hold a combination of liaison and 
representative roles (import from their own region and export outside their region, thus acting 
as global distributors). It appears that, in this product group, rising powers are becoming 
increasingly integrated into the international production network by establishing global trade 
ties and linking their geographic region to the global network.  
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4.2.3. Rubber and metal parts 
The weighted E-I index results for rubber and metal components shown in Table 6 and 
Figure 6 indicate that East Asia & Pacific and EU28 are both characterised by regionalisation 
trends. Both Germany and Japan, two traditional leaders, have strong gatekeeper roles, while 
the emerging economies hold representative roles. The representative role potentially indicates 
that these countries are further integrating globally by linking their region to other in the 
international production network. Looking at Figures 3-b and 3-c, regional production networks 
can be seen for East Asia & Pacific, EU28 and Latin America & Caribbean, but these are 
embedded in global (red) ties.  
 
4.3. Discussion of findings 
Blázquez and González-Díaz (2015) in their analysis of the automotive industry provide a 
general descriptive analysis of the network of final goods along with automotive parts and 
components. Similarly to our findings, they find that the network has become denser and more 
extensive over time since countries have, on average, increased the number of partners with 
which they trade. However, while we find that export centralisation has decrease over time 
across all components, meaning that exports have become more evenly distributed across a 
higher number of countries, these authors find that exports have become more concentrated. 
Both our study and their study agree, however, on the fact that the network of auto parts and 
components has maintained a core-periphery structure, in which regional clusters have arisen 
and hubs have become increasingly important. The authors conclude that although 
agglomeration forces clearly prevail in the world auto trade network and spatial imbalance 
remains, centrifugal forces are expanding the network around new areas. 
Iapadre and Tajoli (2014), in their analysis at an aggregated level reach a different 
conclusion, finding that the degree of trade regionalization has fallen substantially between 
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1995 and 2011 in all the four regions covered, and show that the forces driving towards global 
integration have been stronger than the trade-diverting effects of regional integration. We find 
this to be the case for engines, but not for the other two components.  
The fact that the literature doesn’t reflect a consensus demonstrates how important the level 
of aggregation are, suggesting that results found at an aggregated level may not apply at a more 
disaggregated, industry specific, level. Sturgeon et al. (2009) in their analysis of the automotive 
industry highlight how global, regional, national and local value chains are nested to create a 
pattern of global integration that is distinctive to the industry.  
Consistently with their and other studies (see for example Frigant and Zumpe, 2014), our 
analysis shows that the degree of regionalisation and globalisation of trade in auto parts is 
heterogeneous across regions and components. Overall the EU28 and East Asia & the Pacific 
are characterised by relatively few far-distance flows. On the contrary, other regions rely more 
heavily on far-distance flows. The European case is particularly striking. The 2000–2012 period 
witnessed the enlargement of the Union towards Eastern and Central Europe. This evolution 
enabled suppliers to discover new areas (in Eastern Europe primarily) in order to segment their 
production process on a larger scale and profit from the differences between countries (e.g. 
labour costs, labour legislation, etc.).  
In Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East production networks tend to expand over long 
distances. This is again consistent with Frigant and Zumpe’s (2014) findings in their study of 
the automotive industry.  
Our findings show that in North America far-distant flows increased significantly over the 
period examined for two of the thee components, namely engines and rubber&metal. Frigant 
and Zumpe (2014) suggest four factors that may explain this trend: 1) exhaustion of the process 
of regional integration, which in this region started earlier; 2) the entry of China into the World 
Trade Organisation in 2001, which offered new localisation opportunities for low cost 
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production of components destined for both original car equipment and the spare parts market; 
3) specific regulations that compel certain production types in the areas (this is the case with 
rare earth restrictions in China for example); and 4) the financial crisis that impacted the United 
States heavily from 2008 which forced many suppliers to shut down their North American 
production sites at a time when they were setting up new production capacities in Asia. The last 
three points are also made by Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck (2011). 
Overall, when examining the brokerage role of rising powers and the traditional key players 
in the industry, there seems to be an association between the strengthening of regionalisation 
patterns and traditional players (such as Japan and Germany) acting as gatekeepers. The results 
also indicate an increased tendency for the rising powers to link their regions to the international 
trade network, along with taking representative or global liaison roles. The exception to this is 
China in the case of electric and electrical parts, where it plays a gatekeeper role at the centre 
of a new Asian regional production network. These findings suggest that traditional players and 
rising powers play different roles within each region; while the former seem to maintain 
gatekeeper roles, strengthening regionalisation patterns over time, rising powers have come to 
play a more international role.  
In his analysis of global production sharing in East Asia, Athukorala (2011) concludes that 
while economic interdependence among countries in the region has strenghtened over time, 
with China playing a pivotal role as the premier center of final assembly, this has not lessened 
the dependence of the export dynamism of these countries on the global economy. He argues 
that the rise of global production sharing has strengthened the case for a global, rather than 
regional, approach to trade and investment policymaking. 
This finding is in line with those of Iapadre and Tajoli (2014). Their results show that the 
BRICs are the most globalized countries in terms of connectivity to the world trading system 
in each of their respective regions, suggesting that given the advantage of this position, they 
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could play the important role of linking smaller nearby countries to the large international 
markets. They conclude that insofar as PTAs give rise to outward looking structures, they can 
be useful policy instruments for development. While there is a risk for the smaller countries to 
become dependent on a very strong centre, the authors suggest that this link can be their best 
chance to grow as exporters.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Over the past quarter century, the forces of regionalisation and globalisation, the 
participation of new emerging economies and the financial crisis have significantly transformed 
the organisation of production.  
In this paper we have analysed the case of automotive parts and components trade in seeking 
answers to the following questions: 1) Has the structure of trade changed over the last two 
decades, especially with the participation in the production process of emerging economies as 
new suppliers? 2) Has regionalisation increased over time, and do tendencies towards 
regionalisation differ across automotive components groups? 3) How do patterns of 
multipolarity interact with regionalisation trends, and more specifically, how does the role that 
rising powers play within and between regions interact with regionalisation patterns? 
We have sought to answer these questions by applying network measures to highly 
disaggregated trade data for three automotive parts and components groups with different 
technological intensity (electric and electrical parts, engines, and rubber and metal). 
Our findings suggest that with respect to the first research question the structure of trade in 
automotive components has changed significantly over the last two decades, especially with the 
participation of emerging economies in the production process as new suppliers. This is 
particularly visible in the case of electric and electrical parts, with a leading role being played 
by China and Eastern European countries. The average number of exporting partners has 
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increased over time for all components, while the average value of ties has decreased over time 
for all components except engines. This shows the rising number of suppliers to major auto 
producers, and these suppliers are located in many emerging and developing countries that are 
now participating to international production networks in the sector, unlike in the past. The 
engine subsector runs counter this trend, as it has remained more oligopolistic, with a fewer 
number of suppliers.  
Despite the fact that exports in all parts and components examined have become more 
evenly distributed across countries since the 2000s, the network for electric and electrical parts 
and engines has evolved into a more core-periphery structure over time. This has been 
accompanied by a shrinking of the core and the participation of new countries. The case of 
rubber and metal suggests instead a move towards a less hierarchical division of labour.  
With respect to the second research question regarding tendencies towards regionalisation, 
our results show important differences across different automotive components and regions. 
For example, while there has been a strengthening of regionalisation in EU28 and East Asia, 
particularly in electric and electrical parts, and the emergence of a new regional production 
network, while other regions seem to show a prevalence of long-distance ties.  The literature 
does not show a consensus on this aspect, and one possible explanation is that the level of 
aggregation matters, and findings at a more aggregated level may conflict with those obtained 
on a specific industry; even more so when looking at the trade in parts and components within 
a specific industry. These differences are especially relevant for policy decision-making.  
With respect to our third and last research question about how the brokerage role of rising 
powers interacts with regionalisation patterns, there seems to be an association between the 
strengthening of regionalisation patterns and traditional players (such as Japan and Germany) 
acting as gatekeepers. The brokerage roles also indicate an increased tendency for the rising 
powers to take representative and liaison roles and link their regions to the international trade 
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network. The exception to this is China in the case of electric and electrical parts, where it plays 
a gatekeeper role at the centre of a new Asian regional production network. These results seem 
to suggest that traditional players and rising powers play different roles within each region; 
while the former maintain gatekeeper roles, strengthening regionalisation over time, rising 
powers have come to play a more international role.  Given the advantage of their position, 
these powers could play an important role in linking smaller countries to the large international 
markets, helping to build a multipolar world characterised by a more even distribution of power.  
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Tables 
Table 1 Percentage of world trade covered by threshold  
                                   Threshold 0.01% 0.001% 
 Coverage of world trade (%) 
Electric and electrical parts   
1993 96.39  98.17 
2003 92.50 96.40 
2013 93.39 97.92 
Engines   
1993 98.37 99.90  
2003 95.4 99.55 
2013 94.85 99.56 
Rubber and metal parts   
1993 97.09 99.14 
2003 91.66 97.15 
2013 92.35 97.73 
 
 
Table 2 Brokerage Roles 
Brokerage Role Visualisation Description 
Coordinator 
 
Coordinators link countries in the same region, 
deepening region production sharing.  
Gatekeeper 
 
Gatekeepers import from other regions and then 
distribute exports in their own region, therefore 
acting as a regional supplier.  
Representative 
 
Representatives import from their own region and 
export outside the region. These nations act as 
global distributors for their region.  
Consultant 
 
Consultants link countries from the same region, 
where they act as external players to regional 
production networks. 
Liaison 
 
Countries acting as Liaisons link countries from 
different regional partitions. 
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Table 3 Results table – Descriptive network measures 
 Electric  and electrical parts Engines Rubber and metal parts 
  1993 2003 2013 1993 2003 2013 1993 2003 2013 
Network size 84 86 105↑ 73 65 73 90 113 111  
Reciprocity 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.23 ↑ 0.15 0.28 0.15 
Exports 
concentration 
(Out 
Centralisation) 30.53% 26.24% 24.99% 38.81% 31.74% 34.21% 39.84% 25.83% 26% 
Avg of export 
partners (Out-
Degree 
Centrality) 
3.66 6.95 7.26 3.44 7.00 7.71 4.93 7.32 8.66 
Avg_of export 
flow value 
(Weighted out-
Degree 
Centrality) 0.181 0.168 0.153 0.188 0.274 0.302 0.253 0.162 0.154 
Core-periphery    
(C-P)                  
(Final fitness)   
     C     P                                            C     P                               C P                                      C P                                       C P                                           C     P                            C P                                      C P                                      C P                           
 C  1.15  0.07  C  1.51   0.02  C 1.36   0.01   C  0.94  0.03  C 3.75  0.06 C  3.08  0.06                                                                                                       C 2.05 0.070   C 2.20 0.04 C 0.52  0.02 
 P  0.01  0.00                P 0.05  0.00                     P 0.05 0.00                   P  0.02  0.00  P  0.01  0.02 P  0.01   0.01 P  0.02   0.00      P  0.03   0.00       P  0.03  0.00       
(0.62) (0.56) (0.63) (0.48) (0.65) (0.65) (0.75) (0.62) (0.48) 
Countries in the 
core 
Belgium-
Luxembourg, 
France, 
Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, 
Japan, UK. 
China, Hong 
Kong, Japan, 
Mexico, US. 
China, Japan, 
Mexico, 
Republic of 
Korea, US. 
Austria, 
Belgium-
Luxembourg, 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy, Japan, 
Spain, 
Sweden, UK. 
Canada, 
Mexico, US. 
Canada, 
Mexico, US. 
Belgium-
Luxembourg, 
France, 
Germany, Italy, 
UK. 
Canada, 
Japan, US. 
Canada, 
China, 
Germany, 
Japan, 
Mexico, 
Republic of 
Korea, US. 
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Table 4 List of countries forming part of the networks, including entries and exits 
  Countries                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electric 
and 
electrical 
parts 
1
9
9
3 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium-Luxembourg, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, French Guiana, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Martinique, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russia, Réunion, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, US, United 
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela 
2
0
0
3 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen 
2
0
1
3 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engines 
1
9
9
3 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Martinique, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Réunion, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
2
0
0
3 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, 
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam 
2
0
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
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1
3 
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rubber 
and metal 
parts 
1
9
9
3 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium-Luxembourg, Bhutan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Fiji, 
Finland, Ethiopia, France, French Guiana, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Martinique, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Réunion, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
 
2
0
0
3 
Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macao, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
2
0
1
3 
Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Norway,  Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of 
Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
UK, US, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Bold = New countries entering the network  
Italics =Exit in the next time period 
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Table 5 Brokerage Roles for Rising Powers and traditional players (2003 & 2013) 
 Electric and electrical parts Engines Rubber and metal parts 
Countries 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 
China  Gatekeeper Gatekeeper Representative Gatekeeper Liaison Liaison 
India  - Liaison - Liaison  Liaison  Liaison 
Brazil Representative Representative Liaison Representative Representative Representative 
Russia Liaison Liaison Liaison Liaison Liaison Liaison 
Germany Gatekeeper Gatekeeper Gatekeeper Representative Gatekeeper Gatekeeper 
Japan  Gatekeeper Gatekeeper Gatekeeper Gatekeeper Liaison Gatekeeper 
USA Liaison Liaison Liaison Liaison Liaison Liaison 
 
Table 6 Weighted E-I index 
  Electric and electrical parts Engines Rubber and Metal parts 
Regions 1993 2003 2013 1993 2003 2013 1993 2003 2013 
East Asia & Pacific -0.3474 -0.32236 -0.50216 -0.2549 -0.34069 -0.04634 -0.02039 -0.13913 -0.06759 
EU28 -0.07706 -0.41614 -0.27589 -0.63065 -0.58634 -0.41401 -0.18659 -0.55771 -0.36084 
Eurasia 1 0.949512 0.904893 1 1 0.987661 1 0.902385 0.671102 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.663678 0.201331 0.287611 0.567378 0.555738 0.711451 0.301434 0.40303 0.352585 
Middle East & North Africa 0.85627 0.529461 0.55586 1 0.84456 0.893678 0.857143 0.739345 0.78744 
North America 0.120721 0.185078 0.283248 -0.29624 -0.30388 -0.08361 -0.22979 -0.23432 0.201421 
Other European 1 0.980328 0.959196 1 0.980081 1 0.931548 0.555556 0.608974 
South Asia 1 1 0.508042 1 1 1 0.444444 -0.11765 0.744134 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 0.402191 0.372483 1 -0.01757 0.586468 1 0.441259 0.423556 
Central Asia - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 
The Weighted E-I score can range from 1 to -1.  
Positive values indicate that the majority of trade (value) occurs outside the region. 
Negative score indicates that majority of trade (value) is regional. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Figure 1-a Electric and electrical parts 1993  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region 
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Figure 1-b Electric and electrical parts 2003  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region  
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Figure 1-c Electric and electrical parts 2013  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region  
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Figure 2 
Figure 2-a Engines 1993  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Figure 2-b Engines 2003  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Figure 2-c Engines 2013  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region 
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Figure 3 
Figure 3-a Rubber and metal parts 1993  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region 
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Figure 3-b Rubber and metal parts 2003  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region 
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Figure 3-c Rubber and metal parts 2013  
 
Red ties: Connect countries across 
different regions 
Blue ties: Connect countries within a 
same region 
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Figure 4 Weighted E-I map for electric and electrical parts 
   
The Weighted E-I score can range from 1 to -1.  
Positive values indicate that the majority of trade (value) occurs outside the region. 
Negative score indicates that majority of trade (value) is regional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Electrical Parts 1993
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Electrical Parts 2003
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Electrical Parts 2013
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Figure 5 Weighted E-I map for engines 
   
The Weighted E-I score can range from 1 to -1.  
Positive values indicate that the majority of trade (value) occurs outside the region. 
Negative score indicates that majority of trade (value) is regional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Engines 1993
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Engines 2003
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Engines 2013
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Figure 6 Weighted E-I map for rubber and metal parts 
   
The Weighted E-I score can range from 1 to -1.  
Positive values indicate that the majority of trade (value) occurs outside the region. 
Negative score indicates that majority of trade (value) is regional 
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Weighted E-I Index Rubber & Metal Parts 1993
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Rubber & Metal Parts 2003
-1 1
Weighted E-I Index Rubber & Metal Parts 2013
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1 In this paper we use the term ‘rising powers’ to refer to the BRICs.  
2 Data are tabulated using importer records, more reliable than the corresponding exporter records. 
3 Our classification is similar to the parts product listings adopted by the US Office of Aerospace and Automotive 
Industries (OAAI). Like OAAI, our classification attempts to closely approximate to the core automotive industry 
by excluding certain items, for example parts explicitly listed for motorcycles, golf-carts, snowmobiles, 
agricultural equipment, etc. 
4 These were chosen as reference years in order to compare the recent structure of the components trade with that 
prevailing a decade before. Due to the sharp decrease in overall trade volume after 2008, during the global 
economic crisis, that year was chosen as the most recent reliable year.   
5 Out-strength Centrality is the sum of bilateral trade relationships weighted for their relative value, so it is a degree 
centrality calculated on value rather than binary data. Amighini and Gorgoni (2013) show how the ranking of the 
most central country in the network changes depending on which centrality measure is used. The countries that 
have more trade partners are not necessarily those that account for most of the trade. 
6 To perform the core-periphery analysis we used the categorical procedure on valued data using the CORR 
algorithm (Borgatti and Everett, 1999). 
                                                 
